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Trends in Communist Propaganda

12 Mar 75

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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12 MARCH 1975
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MIDDLE EAST

NEW KISSINGER ROUND PROMPTS USSR CRITICISM OF "PARTIAL STEPS"

Moscow has again been giving only minimal attention to Secretary Kissinger's current round of talks in the Middle East, and comment has thus far been confined to a PRAVDA article and scattered broadcasts from Moscow's "Radio Peace and Progress." This material, along with other comment on the Arab-Israeli problem which has not specifically mentioned the Kissinger mission, continues to be critical of the U.S.-sponsored "step-by-step" negotiating approach. Moscow has cast doubt on the value and prospects of Kissinger's efforts, at the same time emphasizing firm Syrian and Palestinian opposition to new "partial" Arab-Israeli agreements. Comment reiterates standard charges that such agreements ignore Palestinian interests, disrupt Arab unity, and delay a comprehensive settlement, for which the "appropriate venue" is the Geneva conference.

PRAVDA COMMENT In the only available press comment directly pegged to the Kissinger talks, PRAVDA on the 9th, as reported by TASS, employed a device used during previous Kissinger rounds in assailing the Western press for allegedly extravagant claims for the Secretary's diplomacy. Thus PRAVDA charged that Western media were attempting to generate an artificial atmosphere of optimism around his current mission, "in every way publicizing the step-by-step tactic which is allegedly conducive to a peaceful settlement." On the contrary, according to PRAVDA, the U.S. approach is intended to disunite the Arabs and accustom particular states to continued Israeli "annexation," and it cited as evidence Israeli statements "rejecting any talks with representatives of the Palestinian Arabs" and "refusing to evacuate the Golan Heights." PRAVDA further asserted that Israel was using the "partial settlement" approach as a cover for "material preparation of another aggression," and pointed to increased Israeli defense expenditures.

KISSINGER IN EGYPT, SYRIA TASS on the 9th summed up remarks to the press by President as-Sadat and Secretary Kissinger, in a sentence devoted to each, after their talks in Aswan. The Egyptian president was cited as saying he would speak of results and prospects for agreement after Kissinger's trip to Israel, and the Secretary was reported as saying the talks "covered all elements" pertaining to the Mideast situation. The TASS dispatch went on to quote Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy as saying that Egypt aimed at a lasting peace settlement which would "first of all" secure the

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Palestinians' rights. The dispatch reported the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY as noting that at the Aswan talks Egypt demanded the return of the Sinai passes and the oil fields but that "no definite proposals" had been set forth so far.

The TASS item noted that Kissinger had left for Israel with a stopover in Damascus, and Moscow's Arabic-language service, also on the 9th, brushed off Kissinger's talks with al-Asad in a sentence, going on to report the Syrian president's remarks to newsmen without mentioning that Kissinger was present. The account cited al-Asad as saying that Syria would go along on another agreement on Israeli withdrawal "provided it takes into consideration all fronts," but that Syria was opposed to separate and partial agreements. The broadcast also noted that when asked if Syria would sign a peace treaty with Israel, al-Asad said Syria was "prepared to end the state of confrontation" with Israel in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338. The Arabic-language broadcast cited al-Asad as saying that what was important was to make progress toward establishing real peace and "not only the signing of agreements." According to Western press accounts, al-Asad--in a remark which Moscow of course ignored--also implied criticism of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in commenting that "we are not enamored of peace treaties, even those of friendship." TASS on the 5th, in reporting an al-Asad interview published in the Washington POST, stressed his warning that attempts to achieve a separate Israeli-Egyptian agreement could block efforts to reach a peace settlement and implement Resolution 338.

MOSCOW EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN INTERESTS

Moscow continues to portray itself as a supporter of Palestinians and of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as their representative, but with some evident reservations over entanglement in the complex relations between the PLO and its fellow Arabs. Thus Moscow upgraded somewhat its public recognition of the PLO, on 7 March referring to it directly for the first time in a communique--albeit a low-level one--as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinians. And after initial guarded reaction, Moscow came down on the PLO side in its row with Egypt over the 26 February PLO statement criticizing new "partial" Arab-Israeli agreements and implicitly attacking Cairo's policies.

As for Syrian-Palestinian relations, Soviet media reported favorable Palestinian reaction to President al-Asad's 8 March proposal for joint Syrian-Palestinian political and military commands. But Moscow implicitly conveyed its concern over the implications of such an

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arrangement for Syrian and Palestinian attendance at Geneva-- according to al-Asad, either jointly or not at all. A Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee delegation has arrived in Damascus, apparently to take soundings in talks with Palestinians and Syrians. Moscow radio has also reported the PLO's appointment--long delayed--of a "head of its mission in Moscow"; the USSR last August had given consent, at PLO request, for "PLO representation" in Moscow.

PLO RECOGNITION A joint Soviet-Algerian communique, reported by TASS on the 7th, on a visit to Algiers by a Soviet delegation of the trade union of Electric Power Stations and Electrical Industry, contained Moscow's first direct reference in a communique to the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine." Although the delegation's visit was low-level and the communique was issued jointly with a state that has long been a fervent supporter of the Palestinians, the reference marked a perceptible advance in Soviet public support of the PLO. In the past Moscow has shown itself reluctant to extend this particular sign of official recognition to the PLO. Soviet media have, however, often referred "with satisfaction" to resolutions passed at Arab summit conferences in Algiers (November 1973) and Rabat (October 1974) designating the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" of all Palestinians. In addition, individual Soviet commentators have occasionally referred to the PLO in this fashion:

+ A 26 February PRAVDA article by V. Peresada asserted that Israel refuses to recognize Palestinian national interests "and their legitimate representative's--the PLO's--right to participate in the Geneva forum."

+ A commentator on Moscow radio's 16 February observers' roundtable, F. Seyful-Mulyukov, referred to rumored disagreements between "the PLO--which is, of course, recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the interests of the Arab people of Palestine--and the Jordanian Government."

+ Soviet Mideast specialist Igor Belyayev, on Moscow radio's "International Situation" program on 8 February, referred to various Palestinian organizations, "including the sole representative of the Palestinian Arab people, the PLO."

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+ An article by V. Vladimirovskiy in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No. 2, signed to press 21 January 1975, called the PLO an organization that represents the Palestinians' "fundamental interests and acts as a lawful representative on their behalf in the international arena."

PLO-CAIRO RIFT Moscow at first reacted gingerly to the 26 February PLO executive committee statement which evoked a stiff public response from Cairo. The statement contained thinly veiled allusions to Egypt's apparent willingness to accept U.S.-sponsored "partial" Arab-Israeli agreements, said to be "an attempt to liquidate the Palestinian cause." Initial cautious Soviet treatment sought to minimize the dispute, implying on 3 March that elements of the Egyptian press had manufactured the controversy. However, Moscow radio's Arabic-language service on the 10th explicitly raised the issue of the PLO statement. The commentary, pegged to the opening day of a "week of international solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people" sponsored by the World Peace Council, commented that the opinion expressed in the 26 February PLO statement "cannot be disputed by those who sincerely want to see a durable peace and not a temporary truce in the Middle East." And in an indirect reference to Cairo the broadcast said that since the Palestinian issue, "complicated as it may be," must be solved, "why then do some want to put it off for a long time and then express astonishment at the fact that such an attitude toward the Palestinian issue arouses the suspicion and the indignation of the Palestinians?"

DAMASCUS-PLO UNITY Moscow reported without comment Syrian President al-Asad's expression, in his 8 March revolution anniversary speech, of Syrian readiness to establish single Syrian-Palestinian political and military commands "to strengthen the Palestinian struggle." IZVESTIYA on the 11th carried a Beirut-dated dispatch, broadcast the same day by Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic, citing favorable Palestinian response to the proposal. The dispatch noted that PLO chairman 'Arafat had sent al-Asad a telegram stating that the Palestinians and "their leadership in the person of the PLO warmly welcome your call to form a united political and military command."

However, IZVESTIYA by omission suggested some Soviet uneasiness over subsequent al-Asad remarks on the unity proposal as it might affect Syrian and Palestinian participation at the Geneva conference. IZVESTIYA reported al-Asad as saying, at a press

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conference on the 9th prior to his discussions with Kissinger, that his proposed unity of political and military leaderships "would give the Palestinians an opportunity to participate" at Geneva. But the paper failed to mention al-Asad's further observation, as reported by Western media, that the arrangement "might prevent Syria from being there [in Geneva], which, in essence, means either all go together or we don't go."

SOVIET AASC In another reflection of Soviet interest in
DELEGATION current Palestinian and Syrian views, TASS on
 the 10th reported that a delegation of the
Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (AASC), headed by one
of the organization's deputy chairmen, Vladimir Kudryavtsev,
had left for Syria and Lebanon "at the invitation of the
Palestine Peace and Solidarity Committee." Interviewed by
TASS before leaving for Damascus, Kudryavtsev said that the aim
of the trip was to strengthen ties between the "Soviet public
and the Palestinian liberation movement" and to become familiar
"with the tasks facing the Palestinian resistance movement in
the present complex situation in the Middle East." He said
the delegation would talk with Palestinian "leaders and rank-
and-file fighters," leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committees--"in particular the leadership of the Arab
Front of Assistance to the Palestinian Revolution"--and with
Lebanese politician Kamal Jumblatt.

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SOVIET GENEVA CONFERENCE ENVOY, OTHER GROUPS, VISIT JORDAN

The latest in a series of recent Soviet visitors to Amman is Vladimir Vinogradov, the Soviet Union's representative to the Geneva peace conference. His arrival on an "official visit" as a "special envoy" was first reported by the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (SANA) on the 10th, Amman radio confirming his presence the following day; the visit has thus far not been mentioned in monitored Soviet media.* Vinogradov was preceded to Amman by an Islamic delegation and a Supreme Soviet delegation. The timing of these visits presumably was not connected with the present Kissinger mission in the Mideast and Moscow's efforts for prompt reconvening of the Geneva conference; however, Vinogradov's visit would appear to be directly related to these diplomatic moves. The departure for Damascus of a Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee delegation for a visit at the invitation of the Palestinian counterpart committee would seem to suggest that Moscow is sounding out Palestinian, Syrian, and Jordanian views on prospects for a reconvened Geneva conference and ways of effecting Palestinian representation at the talks.

Amman radio on 11 March announced Vinogradov's visit in reporting that he had been received that day by Premier and Foreign Minister ar-Rifai for a meeting of over two hours. According to Amman, the discussion dealt with bilateral relations, the situation in the Mideast, and "Arab political moves in general and Jordan's moves in particular" on the Mideast crisis. Vinogradov was reported by SANA on the 10th as saying on his arrival that he had come to "conduct a political dialogue with high-ranking Jordanian officials particularly concerning the Middle East problem." He expressed hope that his talks would be "useful and constructive" to "consolidate our future joint action."

RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN, PALESTINIANS The talks being conducted in Amman and Damascus by Soviet visitors appear to indicate Moscow's interest in exploring the possibilities of any Jordanian-PLO rapprochement and the question of representation at Geneva. Moscow in comment over the past several months has tended to weigh in on the side of the PLO

* Moscow has given little, if any, attention to Vinogradov's Geneva conference role since Moscow's domestic service announced, in reporting the 22 December 1973 ministerial session of the Geneva conference, that he would represent the USSR at subsequent sessions.

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and the idea of a separate Palestinian state. For instance, an article by Kudryavtsev in IZVESTIYA last September, describing Jordan's attitude toward the PLO as "puzzling," recalled that according to the 1947 UN decision the West Bank should have been "part of the Arab Palestinian state but was actually annexed to the then Transjordan." Recent comment on the issue has pointed up the dilemma, supporting the PLO and a separate Palestinian state but recognizing that a Jordanian role may be essential given Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO.

Authoritative Soviet Mideast commentator Igor Belyayev, in an article in ZA RUBEZHOM (signed to press 27 February), said that according to the decisions of the Arab summit conference in Rabat last October, steps should be taken to "create a Palestinian national administration" on the West Bank, and "the PLO should form it." He wondered, however, if Israel "is still against any talks with the PLO," and recalled that in January Husayn had proposed to mediate. Noting Palestinian objections to this idea, he remarked that the Jordanian monarch, according to the Rabat decisions, "has nothing in common with the West Bank." But Belyayev acknowledged realities in observing that Israel "continues to recognize King Husayn as the only partner in future talks" on the West Bank problem.

On the other hand, Belyayev found the PLO's "negative position" regarding Jordanian mediation "quite understandable" since the Rabat decisions might be forgotten and Husayn's idea of a federal structure for Jordan as a united kingdom--an idea advanced in March 1972*--would be revived. Belyayev indicated that he leaned to the idea of a separate Palestinian state, observing that Jordanian and Palestinian provinces would be created in such a kingdom and, "in other words, the question of creating an independent Arab Palestine, like a just solution of the Palestinian problem as a whole, will also be left pending."

A somewhat different view was expressed by PRAVDA's Orekhov in a 14 February article relating a visit to Jordan. Orekhov claimed that "many political leaders in Amman" now recognized the need for rapprochement of viewpoints and coordinated action between the Jordanian authorities and the PLO. Reiterating the usual plea for Arab unity, Orekhov conceded that "there is much yet to be done in this direction" to overcome "existing difficulties" between Jordan and the PLO.

* Soviet reaction to Husayn's proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 32-33, and 29 March 1972, pages 21-22.

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SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION Orekhov in his PRAVDA article also set the stage for the 3-10 March visit of a Supreme Soviet delegation led by Presidium deputy chairman Matchanov, claiming that "great significance" was being attached to this delegation's March visit to Jordan.* TASS on the 3d, announcing the beginning of the visit, called it an "important positive event" in Soviet-Jordanian relations, and cited the Jordanian ambassador to the USSR as remarking that this was the first visit of Soviet parliamentarians to Jordan in return for an earlier Jordanian parliamentary delegation's visit to the USSR. (According to TASS on 29 March last year, the invitation was extended by the Jordanian ambassador in a call on the chairman of the Soviet of the Union, Shitikov.)

Moscow has given light coverage to the visit, with TASS on the 5th reporting that Husayn, in receiving the delegation, expressed Arab gratitude for Soviet support and stressed that Jordan would "do its utmost to maintain friendly relations" with the USSR. Amman radio reported Husayn as hoping that Jordanian-Soviet relations would be further strengthened by future Soviet officials' visits and through bilateral meetings. Recalling his visit to the Soviet Union--in October 1967--Husayn also expressed the wish that the delegation's visit would be "a new beginning in the future relations" between the two countries.

Matchanov was reported by Amman radio--but not by Moscow--as having stated at a dinner in his honor that the Soviet Union "still considers Jordan as one of the sides directly involved" in the Mideast conflict. According to Matchanov, the Soviet and Jordanian stands on the Mideast question "are very close," opening paths for developing cooperation "in all fields." Matchanov also routinely supported the Geneva conference as the "most appropriate venue" for discussing all aspects of a settlement.

In the communique on the visit, as reported by TASS on the 10th, the Soviet delegation urged the resumption of the Geneva conference "in the very near future" with the participation of "all" parties concerned. The two sides affirmed that peace in the area cannot be established without total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, "including the Arab part of Jerusalem," and insuring the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians "in conformity with their national aspirations."

* Earlier, the Islamic delegation headed by Shaykh Babakhanov paid a four-day visit in late February, apparently in the course of a tour of Arab countries, leaving Amman for Cairo on 1 March.

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Previous Soviet-Jordanian exchanges have been few and far between, and at relatively low level. For instance, during the past two years, a delegation of the Jordanian Afro-Asian solidarity organization visited the Soviet Union in August 1973; in March 1974 a Jordanian-Soviet friendship society delegation paid a two-week visit to the USSR; and in June last year a Soviet friendship society delegation returned the visit. In March 1973 a Jordanian group studied prefabricated housing in the USSR, and just over a year later, in April 1974, a delegation of Soviet experts in this field spent a month in Jordan. Annual cultural cooperation plans were signed in the spring of 1973 and 1974.

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PRG DEFENDS MILITARY ATTACKS, CALLS FOR THIEU'S REMOVAL

Widespread communist attacks in South Vietnam to date have received little attention in Hanoi or PRG media. At this writing, the only explicit mention of the major communist assault on Ban Me Thuot, capital of Darlac Province, was in an 11 March PRG Foreign Ministry statement rejecting unspecified U.S. and GVN "slandorous" charges against the PRG and North Vietnam. The statement said merely: "Recently the people in Ban Me Thuot and many other townships, together with the PLAF, have risen up in struggle against the Nguyen Van Thieu clique to win back their right to be masters." Also on the 11th Hanoi issued an official statement, at the lower level of a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, condemning remarks the day before by a U.S. State Department spokesman regarding massive North Vietnamese infiltration and escalated communist attacks in the South. The spokesman made no specific reference to the current action in the South. He said only that given the GVN and U.S. violations of the peace accord, the PLAF and the "people" of South Vietnam have no alternative except to launch counterattacks.

While there are no reports detailing the continuing battle for Ban Me Thuot, brief news items have noted communist attacks elsewhere in South Vietnam. Thus, VNA reported 4 March "counterattacks" along Route 19 in Binh Dinh Province and engagements in Quang Tri on 8-9 March. For its part, Liberation Radio on the 12th claimed that on the previous day communist forces had seized control of two military subsectors and district capitals of Tien Phuoc and Hau Duc, in Quang Tin Province--designated Quang Nam by the communists.

Judging from past behavior, any military successes will be publicized by the Vietnamese communists when they are confident that their objectives have been achieved. Thus, the series of communist attacks in December and January in Phuoc Long Province had initially been given similar low-keyed treatment. But the 6 January capture of the provincial capital of Phuoc Binh prompted an outpouring of comment praising and defending the action as a "just" response to alleged GVN violations of the Paris agreement.*

* For a discussion of Vietnamese communist media treatment of the capture of Phuoc Binh, see the TRENDS of 8 January 1975, pages 8-10, and 15 January 1975, pages 10-12.

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PRG FOREIGN MINISTRY As have previous statements since the
STATEMENT OF 11 MARCH January 1973 peace accord, the PRG
Foreign Ministry statement on the 11th
said the communists' military attacks are necessary because of
U.S. and Saigon violations of the accord. The PRG had in effect
announced a policy of offensive action in the PLAF Command order
issued on 15 October 1973 which said that GVN attacks would be met
by "counterattacks." The current statement recalled the PLAF order
in referring to the action in Ban Me Thuot. Claiming that the
"grave situation" in South Vietnam was due to U.S. actions, the
statement condemned Washington for its assistance to the GVN and
alleged that "disguised" U.S. military personnel had been brought
into South Vietnam and that Washington sought to "intimidate"
the Vietnamese with its "deterrent forces."

The current foreign ministry statement also reiterated the demands
of the 8 October PRG statement which, among other things, had
formally endorsed the calls for Thieu's ouster--which had been
revived in routine propaganda two months earlier for the first
time since the January 1973 agreement. The 11 March statement
demanded that the United States end its involvement in South Vietnam,
that GVN President Thieu be "toppled," and that a new administration
be set up in Saigon to negotiate with the PRG. It also called upon
"compatriots" and PLAF combatants to "intensify their solidarity,
heighten their vigilance, and resolutely deal appropriate punitive
blows to all acts of war and sabotage" of the peace agreements
by the United States and the GVN.

SIHANOUK HITS U.S. MOVES, CAMBODIAN FRONT ALLIES OFFER SUPPORT

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk, in a 7 March appeal, has warned against
U.S. military intervention in Cambodia and reiterated Cambodian
Front (NUFC) opposition to negotiations with the Lon Nol government.
NUFC media have replayed earlier Sihanouk statements on the U.S.
role and negotiations, but they focus in their own comment on Front
military achievements and the policy toward the Lon Nol administra-
tion endorsed at last month's national Front congress.* Peking
and Hanoi have authoritatively supported the decisions of the Front
congress and warned against U.S. military action to assist Lon Nol.

* Initial Front comment on the congress and Sihanouk's statement's
of 25 February and 3 March are discussed in the TRENDS of 5 March
1975, pages 1-3.

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Only Hanoi has commented on President Ford's 6 March press conference plea for congressional approval of additional aid to Cambodia.

FRONT Sihanouk's 7 March appeal, so far available only from an NCNA summary, assailed the continuing U.S. airlift into Phnom Penh, the dispatch of U.S. ships and troops to positions off the Cambodian coast, and alleged preparations to send South Vietnamese commandos into Cambodia to help Lon Nol. Warning of a "new and serious threat to the peace of Southeast Asia," Sihanouk appealed to foreign governments to demand an end to U.S. interference. He reiterated his longstanding demand for an end to U.S. involvement in Cambodia so that Cambodians can settle their own affairs and reaffirmed his opposition to negotiations with Lon Nol's administration.

Front media have not originated authoritative comment on alleged U.S. actions and proposals for negotiations and, while describing the Phnom Penh government as being in an increasingly precarious position, have made no predictions of a timetable for victory. NUFC comment on the Front's 24-25 February "national congress" has stressed its decision to offer amnesty to all Phnom Penh officials, with the exception of the top seven leaders. A Front radio editorial of 4 March said that the insurgents "have never in the past made themselves as clear" on this issue, and that the action of the congress was a decision of "historic significance." A 7 March Front radio appeal even indicated that elimination of the top seven leaders would bring peace to Cambodia. In calling on Cambodians to turn against the Phnom Penh leaders it said: "There are only seven of them. Without them the Cambodian nation and people will be at peace."

Sihanouk and China-based RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth sent separate messages of congratulations on the congress to the chief insurgent leader in Cambodia, RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. After the first Front congress in July 1973, only Penn Nouth is known to have sent a congratulatory message. As reported by the Front news agency AKI on 8 and 9 March respectively, Sihanouk conveyed his "warmest, admiring, and affectionate congratulations," and Penn Nouth said that the results of the congress had enhanced the Front's recent "great, decisive, strategic victories." Though the congress had not formally endorsed Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point settlement proposal, Penn Nouth said that the congress' decisions were in conformity with the five points.

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PEKING Chinese authoritative comment on Cambodia has included Politburo member Chi Teng-kuei's statement at a 1 March banquet for Front envoy Ieng Sary and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 2th supporting Sihanouk's 7 March appeal. Ieng Sary, "special adviser" to Khieu Samphan, arrived in China on the 1st, after a stay in North Vietnam since 10 February which had overlapped with Sihanouk's 9-15 February visit to Hanoi for the lunar new year holiday.* While in Peking, Ieng Sary has appeared with Sihanouk at RGNU receptions for visiting foreign guests on 2 and 7 March.

Speaking at the 1 March banquet for Ieng Sary, Chi Teng-kuei "sternly condemned" the U.S. emergency airlift to Phnom Penh and reaffirmed Chinese determination to provide "a powerful backing" for the Cambodian people. As reported by NCNA, Chi lauded the recent Front congress, restated Chinese support for "head of state" Sihanouk, and reaffirmed China's demand that the United States withdraw to allow Cambodians to settle their own affairs. When Ieng Sary visited China as the head of an economic delegation last fall, CCP Politburo member Li Hsien-nien at a 24 November banquet had restated Peking's "international duty" as a "great rear" to support the Cambodian war.

Ieng Sary was also received by Premier Chou En-lai on 4 March; but, in keeping with Peking's usual policy, Chinese media did not publicize the contents of their discussion. Cambodian Front media attributed to Chou an atypically strong statement of support, claiming in an 11 March report that he had assured Ieng Sary of the Chinese people's "unswerving and increasing support and assistance" and predicted that the Front would "certainly win final victory in the near future."

In backing Sihanouk's 7 March appeal, the 9 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article devoted special attention to the buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf of Siam and warned against direct U.S. military involvement in Cambodia. The article also offered Peking's harshest attack in over a year on U.S. efforts to initiate negotiations on Cambodia, denouncing unnamed U.S. "authorities" for engaging in "deceitful talk" in calling for a settlement. It said Washington was using its call for peace talks as a cover to preserve the Phnom Penh government and "win a breathing space," and it reiterated Peking's position that a U.S. disengagement was the key to peace.

* The visits of Sihanouk and Ieng Sary to the DRV are discussed in the TRENDS of 20 February 1975, pages 12-13.

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The article pointedly drew parallels between the present U.S. plight in Cambodia and Washington's declining fortunes in China in 1949, observing that current U.S. efforts to prop up Lon Nol show that the "U.S. imperialists" have not learned from experience but "are still falling into the rut of history."

HANOI DRV Premier Pham Van Dong endorsed the results of the recent NUFC congress and lauded the insurgents' dry season offensive in a 28 February meeting with the RGNU ambassador in Hanoi, reported by VNA on the same day. Hanoi had endorsed the July 1973 Front congress with a DRV Foreign Ministry statement. The premier promised the "resolute support" of the DRV Government and people for the Cambodian struggle, and pledged that they would "do their utmost" to enhance Vietnamese-Cambodian solidarity. A 3 March NHAN DAN commentary pegged to the NUFC congress noted that "the position and strength of the revolution are developing strongly and rapidly" in Cambodia, and that the Phnom Penh government is headed toward "unavoidable collapse" despite U.S. efforts to prop it up.

DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements of 6 and 11 March respectively protested against the deployment of U.S. forces off the Cambodian coast and alleged Saigon preparations to dispatch troops to Cambodia. President Ford's 6 March press conference was assailed in an 11 March NHAN DAN editorial which refuted point-by-point the President's arguments in support of U.S. aid to Phnom Penh. The editorial maintained that the \$222 million requested from Congress by the Administration cannot save Lon Nol's government from collapsing and advised that time is against the United States in Indochina and that if the "imperialists" are "wise" they will find the way out and "flee right now."

MOSCOW After keeping an extremely low posture on Cambodian developments over the past year, Moscow has offered a spate of comment on the present situation, including two articles in PRAVDA by the paper's Hanoi correspondent and a RED STAR commentary. Soviet comment has avoided direct criticism of the Ford Administration for its efforts to aid Cambodia, while portraying Lon Nol as increasingly weak despite "Pentagon" efforts in support. Thus, for example a dispatch from Washington published in PRAVDA on 9 March vaguely reported, from President Ford's 6 March press conference, only that he had made a statement that the United States did not intend to send U.S. armed forces into Cambodia.

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The PRAVDA articles of 1 and 5 March focused on the Front congress and offered Soviet support for the insurgents in noting that the Russians "have always been and still are on the side of the right cause." RED STAR on the 5th underlined the futility of the U.S. airlift and cited a New York TIMES report of Secretary Schlesinger stating that Cambodia would fall irrespective of U.S. aid.

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N O R T H E R N E U R O P E

MOSCOW HITS NATO PLANS TO PROTECT NORTH SEA OIL RIGS

Moscow in recent months has mounted a sustained campaign against what it describes as a "secret" NATO plan to establish security forces to protect the North Sea oil rigs against sabotage. Citing reports from Western newspapers, primarily Scandinavian, Moscow has charged that this plan originated in NATO's Eurogroup last December and that it calls for the establishment of a NATO naval force, the imposition of restrictions on navigation in the drilling areas, and armed guards on the rigs themselves.* Ridiculing the explanation purportedly given by NATO sources that these measures were aimed at thwarting potential Irish or Palestinian terrorist attacks, Moscow has interpreted the episode as demonstrating NATO's long-standing effort to strengthen its northern flank. As such, according to Moscow, NATO's plans pose a threat both to the sovereignty of the Scandinavian countries and to the security of the USSR.

NORWEGIAN INDEPENDENCE Moscow has played on two sources of potential friction in its effort to exacerbate tensions between the Scandinavian countries and the other members of NATO over this issue. One has been the question of Norway's right to exercise full sovereignty over its new oil resources. The other is the question of Norway's (and Denmark's) long-standing policy of opposing the stationing of NATO forces on its national territory.

According to Moscow, one purpose of the NATO plan is to establish precedents and conditions which could be used by NATO to justify the imposition of some measure of control over Norway's oil installations. For example, one of the first Soviet comments on the subject, a brief Moscow domestic service item on 26 December, suggested that the joint security forces could be used to "crush strikes by oil workers or to participate in other social conflicts." More to the point, an article in RURAL LIFE on 2 March spoke of the possibility of NATO invoking a form of eminent domain in the event of an emergency and imposing its control "even if Norway does

* The NEW YORK TIMES carried a London-dated report on 25 December detailing substantially the same account as the Soviet reports have given and attributing the account to "highly placed NATO officials."

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not consent." It is significant, in this connection, that in all its commentaries on the subject, Moscow speaks of the Norwegian (and infrequently of the Danish) oil fields in the North Sea, but ignores the fact that there are a greater number of British fields there. Perhaps Moscow preferred not to mention the British in view of Prime Minister Wilson's February visit to Moscow.

Moscow has also stressed the theme that the NATO plan poses a threat to Norway's policy of opposing the stationing of foreign forces on its territory. An article in RED STAR on 29 December, for example, said that some "Atlanticists" viewed the episode as a good occasion to put pressure on Norway to abandon its independent policy. An article in IZVESTIYA on 8 February interpreted the NATO plan as aimed at "exerting pressure on Norway and Denmark with a view to forcing these countries to abandon their traditional 'non-base' policy. . . ."

THREAT TO Along with playing on the potential frictions in
USSR the NATO alliance, Moscow has expressed indignation
 over the threat to Soviet security interests allegedly
posed by the NATO plan. Moscow has reflected particular concern
in this regard over possible extension of the proposed security
measures to the Barents Sea, which would give NATO forces a highly
strategic vantage point for observing the passage of Soviet vessels
to and from the Atlantic. An article in SOVIET RUSSIA on 16 January,
for example, referring to this possibility, said that this would
put the NATO operations "in the immediate vicinity of the border
with the Soviet Union--a fact which exposes once and for all the
real essence of the plans. . . ." A commentary broadcast to Sweden
on 8 March went so far as to describe the NATO plans as "prepara-
tions for war" and to say that implementation of such plans would
be "incompatible with detente in Europe."

It is notable in this connection that Moscow has given its home audience a full account of the propaganda it has produced on the subject. Indeed, the major central newspapers have carried fairly extensive articles on the subject. This can perhaps be explained by the suitability of the story to Moscow's current propaganda lines on a number of issues. Although the main message of the story seems inconsistent with detente, Moscow has always maintained a critical line on NATO even while cultivating better relations with the United States.

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PEKING WARNS OF SOVIET AIMS IN STRATEGIC DOMINANCE, OIL

Peking has recently extended its customary warnings against Soviet expansion in Europe to encompass charges that the USSR seeks strategic dominance in northern Europe, including paramount control of the area's surrounding seas and newly discovered oil and other resources. At the same time Peking has for the first time given favorable publicity to European calls for establishment of a northern Europe nuclear-free zone that would include major Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula, and has shown approval of European defense measures. For several years Peking has portrayed Europe as the "key" area in Soviet-U.S. international contention. Heretofore, however, Chinese media had focused attention largely on the buildup of Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces facing the NATO armies in Central Europe, and on the competition of Soviet and U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.*

The new, broader Chinese charges were highlighted in a 7 March NCNA commentary which bluntly accused Moscow of responsibility for aggravating tension in northern Europe. NCNA warned that Moscow has been expanding its naval and air power to extend its strategic dominance to a line along the coasts of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands north of Scotland. It said that Soviet fleets have recently made "a show of force" in the Barents, Norwegian, Baltic, and North Seas, and that Moscow has conducted landing exercises which use Sweden, Norway and other northern European countries as simulated targets. As further evidence of expanding Soviet ambitions, recent NCNA reports have publicized claims that Soviet underwater listening devices designed to track ship movements have been discovered as far afield as the coast of Iceland and Britain, and that Soviet reconnaissance planes have engaged in wider-ranging flights and more frequent intrusions into the airspace of Western states.

Peking has given particular attention to the danger posed to northern Europe by the large Soviet nuclear and conventional military presence based at Murmansk and along the Kola peninsula. A 10 March PEOPLE'S DAILY signed article claimed that "the density of nuclear

* For background see the TRENDS of 12 June 1974 pages 25-26.

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weapons deployed by the Soviet Union in this area is the largest in the world in metric tons per kilometer of coast line," that there are 50 Soviet airfields and over 300 military aircraft stationed there, and that the number of Soviet naval vessels cruising in the area accounts for 45 percent of the Soviet fleet, making it "the world's largest naval base." A 27 February NCNA report attacking the Soviet military presence on the Kola peninsula reported favorably on demands by northern European states that the area be declared a nuclear-free zone, Peking's first positive reference to such a proposal in the area.*

In depicting Moscow's eagerness to control oil and fishery resources in North Europe, several NCNA reports have focused on British defense measures against Soviet naval and air spying and intimidation of British North Sea oil rigs. For example, NCNA on 28 February reported that a British minesweeper had been sent to protect an oil rig against harassment from Soviet "trawlers." Peking has also accused Moscow of trying to coerce Norway into granting Moscow greater control over oil and fish resources along the continental shelf of the Barents Sea, and has alleged there are Soviet designs to take Spitzbergen Island away from Oslo. The PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 10 March praised as "totally justified" the enhanced efforts by Western states in the area to coordinate and build up their defense measures against Soviet designs.

* Peking has recently shown approval for such nuclear-free zones, as a means of pointing up the alleged hypocrisy of Soviet calls for international detente. Over the past year China has for the first time given favorable publicity to proposals for establishing nuclear-free zones in South Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans. This new Chinese position was discussed in the TRENDS of 28 August 1974, page 22.

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P R C - I N D I A

PEKING POSITIVE ON CONTACTS, BUT RAPS INDIAN "EXPANSIONISM"

Favorable reporting by Peking media on recent Sino-Indian contacts has not been accompanied by any diminution in China's public opposition to alleged Indian expansionist moves on the subcontinent. Chinese media played up "friendly" Sino-Indian contacts during the February visit to Calcutta and New Delhi by a Chinese table tennis team, portraying these as examples of the cordial relationship between the Chinese and Indian "peoples." Peking also avoided attacks on New Delhi in reporting on the 24-27 February Indian visit by a Soviet military delegation led by Defense Minister Grechko, criticizing only Moscow in this connection. But Peking has continued to encourage India's smaller neighbors to adopt a more independent stance vis-a-vis New Delhi. China has authoritatively stressed support for Nepal's sovereignty, rebuked India's 24 February declaration incorporating Indian-occupied Kashmir into the Indian union, and has revived--after a hiatus of several months--charges against the Indian government's decision last summer to annex Sikkim.

PRC TABLE TENNIS TEAM TOUR,
USSR DEFENSE MINISTER VISITNCNA's coverage of the visit by the
Chinese table tennis team--the first
Chinese delegation to tour India

since the 1960's--was replete with references to "friendly" tour-related meetings between the Chinese and Indian "peoples." NCNA cited remarks by the Chinese delegates testifying to their determination to "cherish" friendship with the Indian people and reported popular demonstrations by the Indian masses displaying enthusiasm for China. Brief NCNA reports noted the "friendly" atmosphere at delegates' meetings with lower-level Indian officials, including an 11 February session with the Governor of West Bengal and a 21 February reception attended by the education secretary of the Indian Ministry of Education.

NCNA's lengthy 2 March report on Grechko's visit to New Delhi avoided charges against India. The report acknowledged that the visit would help India expand its armaments and modernize them, particularly noting Indian interest in a "deep penetration fighter-bomber," but it focused criticism on Moscow's alleged efforts to use the visit to solidify Soviet influence in South Asia as part of Moscow's enhanced world rivalry with the United States. Peking characterized Grechko's tour as a thinly veiled effort to keep India dependent on Soviet arms and enhance the likelihood that New Delhi would agree to the establishment of Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean.

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NEPAL'S INDEPENDENCE,
KASHMIR DISPUTE

Chinese comment during the February coronation of the King of Nepal stressed Chinese support for Nepalese sovereignty.

The 22 February Chinese leaders' message greeting the king's coronation--signed by Premier Chou En-lai and NPC Chairman Chu Teh--lauded Nepal's struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty. PRC Vice Premier Chi Teng-huei, speaking at a 24 February Peking reception marking the coronation, promised firm Chinese support for the Nepalese struggle against "foreign interference."

Peking capped an outpouring of lower-level reportage critical of India's decision to incorporate Kashmir into the Indian union with a 3 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. The article was similar to a 3 July 1974 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article conveying Peking's initial authoritative response to India's moves to gain control of Sikkim.* The current article linked India's action on Kashmir and its annexation of Sikkim, said that New Delhi had repeatedly broken its pledge under terms of the 1948 UN agreement on Kashmir, scored the Indian government's "expansionist features," and portrayed the recent action as detrimental to South Asian peace. Peking appeared to underline its disapproval of New Delhi's Kashmir action in NCNA reports of 2 and 7 March, which respectively noted the Sikkim king's opposition to Indian control of his country, and New Delhi's suppression of antigovernment demonstrations in India--anti-Indian themes that had been absent from Chinese media since late in 1974.

* The 3 July 1974 article is reviewed in the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, page 7. Subsequent authoritative Chinese comment on the issue is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 September 1974, pages 10-11.

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CHINA

PRODUCTION DRIVE REINFORCES STRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL INCENTIVES

The need to focus solely on ideological incentives to speed China's industrial development has been reinforced by an 11 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial entitled "Grasp Theoretical Study, Promote Industrial Production." The editorial--following close on the heels of Yao Wen-yuan's major RED FLAG article this month warning against using material incentives to accelerate economic production*--offers further evidence that Peking expects problems in mobilizing the masses to work harder for higher production without any corresponding increase in personal income.

Discipline and party control remain the dominant themes in Peking's month-old campaign to remove gradually any remaining "bourgeois rights," reflecting Peking's awareness that limiting material incentives poses a potential threat to political order and to China's ambitious economic plans. The decision to limit incentives in fact may in part result from shortcomings in last year's campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, which caused disruption and production shortfalls. As a result, some units used material incentives in order to reach production goals.

Like the 28 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming, the current editorial stressed only the use of ideological incentives to stimulate production, calling for promoting "faster development in industrial production" and for "building our country into a modern powerful socialist state before the end of the century." In stressing the need to strengthen unity and accelerate the pace of industrial development in order to "fulfill or overfulfill the fourth 5-year plan," the editorial warned that "part of the working class and some party members" have been "subjected to erosion by the bourgeoisie" and that they "run counter to the socialist road." It criticized some cadres for refusing to restrict bourgeois rights and for "always thinking of practicing such things as 'material incentive' in some way."

The editorial specifically urged leading groups at all levels to make greater efforts in railway transportation and in the production of iron, steel, coal and electricity. It ordered cadres to continue taking part in productive labor and reiterated the widely quoted

* Yao's article is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 March 1975, pages 15-18.

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phrase from Yao's recent RED FLAG article that urged cadres to promote "nationwide stability and unity." Reflecting the current stress on ideological production incentives, the editorial characterized the theoretical road taken by the Taching oil field as the "only way for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and for developing the socialist industry with greater, faster, better and more economic results."

VOLUNTARY LABOR In an apparent attempt to move away from the practice of using wage incentives and toward motivating young workers to work harder without increased material rewards, a voluntary labor system appears to be emerging on an experimental basis in some areas. The concept of a voluntary labor system was first raised in a February RED FLAG article by Chou Szu that called for study of a Lenin work on proletarian dictatorship which had praised the principle of "communist Saturday voluntary labor."* Chou Szu's RED FLAG article stopped short of urging actual adoption of a voluntary labor system in China, but it characterized such a system as the "first concrete step" by Soviet workers in their march toward communism, and it lauded Lenin's idea of using "large-scale and organized labor to meet the needs of the whole country without remuneration."

Since the appearance of Chou's article early last month the concept of voluntary labor has been raised occasionally in provincial media and applied to China's situation. Honan radio on 14 February, for example, picked up the theme, noting that several hundred local construction workers had engaged in voluntary labor over the spring holidays. On 26 February the Hopei radio carried a HOPEI DAILY report on learning from a model university which noted that five percent college graduates just starting to work "did not want wages." And on 2 March Chengchow radio reported that some 300 cadres and workers of a local building company did voluntary labor at various building sites, and that they had criticized Lin Piao for pushing through "material incentives" and "bonuses in command" and for "doing everything possible to maintain and expand bourgeois rights."

The voluntary labor concept has, however, apparently run into opposition in some areas. An unusually detailed 5 March Lhasa report lauded the Communist Youth League organization of a local hospital for engaging in "voluntary labor on Saturday" in nearby

* The article is discussed in the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT, "China on Need for Proletarian Dictatorship in Socialist Stage," 14 February 1975.

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communes and production units for the past two years, thus creating "great wealth for the state." Noting that the struggle on the question of voluntary labor had become "acute," the broadcast revealed that the CYL youths had been attacked as "publicity seekers" by those who "have peddled the idea of working just for pay."

CADRES WARNED AGAINST BACKSLIDING, CONTROLS STRENGTHENED

A sharply worded 26 February PEOPLE'S DAILY article used language reminiscent of the cultural revolution to warn backsliding cadres against falling behind in the ideological struggle. The article quoted the revolutionary writer Lu Hsun to warn that "the enemy is nothing to be afraid of, the most dreadful thing is the presence of worms in one's own camp." Raising the image of "lice" and "vermin . . . nibbling at our party and state," the article declared that "it goes without saying that the lice that corrode people's minds cannot be put away for good with a single burning, and that the vermin that eat at the country cannot be exterminated by a single burying, because where conditions arise, lice and vermin will breed and multiply." The article called for using the dictatorship of the proletariat "as an iron broom to sweep away such 'worms' as Lin Piao and their ilk, faithful disciples of Confucius."

The harsh tone of the PEOPLE'S DAILY article on "lice" and "vermin" has thus far not been widely reflected in other central articles or in provincial broadcasts on the campaign--these continue to stress moderate methods to deal with the shortcomings of party members. For example, a 7 March Honan broadcast of a HONAN DAILY editorial on studying the need for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat stressed unity and adopted a relaxed stance on errant cadres guilty of even serious mistakes.

Indicating the limited nature of the current stage of the campaign, the Honan editorial called for dealing "accurate" but "forceful blows at the very small number of bad people." Turning to the question of how to deal with capitalist influences among the masses, the editorial urged adopting the method of "education by persuasion, criticism and self-criticism." A 2 March NCNA report, however, praised the leading cadres in a Kiangsu municipality for having "named a number of people" for failing to "seriously read and study." The report charged that some of the people named "even grafted, embezzled and speculated" and took the "criminal road."

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As an answer to the problem of poor local leadership, Kansu provincial radio on 11 March revealed a decision to "select a large number of cadres to form work teams" to go to rural areas. The teams are to rotate personnel each year, but the report stressed that "these teams are here to stay" and said that the decision "pointed out in unequivocal terms that the work teams are responsible, during their rural tenure, for guiding the party members, cadres and masses." Members of the teams were told to put study of the dictatorship of the proletariat "above all other work," while they were also given responsibility to insure increases in agricultural production.

The party work teams apparently have full authority over local party personnel, and the broadcast stated that they "must give top priority to rectifying the leadership bodies and educating the cadres." While stating that most leadership bodies are "basically good" and that most errors can be corrected through study and re-education, the radio called on the teams to "isolate and deal blows at" a handful of class enemies. Not since before the cultural revolution have party work teams been given such authority over local bodies. During the cultural revolution work teams were criticized as tools used by Liu Shao-chi to oppress local revolutionary movements.

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LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST MEDIA APPROVINGLY NOTE LATIN ENERGY CONFERENCE

Havana, Moscow and Peking have approvingly reported the 24-28 February meeting in Jamaica of the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), a union of producers and consumers created in 1973 to plan regional approaches to energy development and pricing. Moscow, like Havana, emphasized Cuba's role in the conference, while Peking stressed the similarity between OLADE's activities and other Third World movements. Communist comment uniformly portrayed the meeting as an example of Latin unity in defense of capitalist threats to natural resources.

HAVANA AND MOSCOW Havana's domestic service, glossing over OLADE's uncertain future in view of Venezuela's continued failure to accept full membership in the organization, reported on 24 February that the Jamaica meeting was "of vital importance," because for the first time a majority of the Latin nations were OLADE members.* Replaying familiar Cuban themes of the decadence and greed of capitalism, the domestic service noted on 27 February that Cuba's delegate, Mining Minister Manuel Céspedes, had blamed "developed capitalist countries, especially the United States" for promoting the energy crisis through "abuse by their multinational corporations." PRENSA LATINA also underscored this theme in reporting the Ecuadorean representative's criticism of the United States' "consumption society" which was said to be "self-destructive and exemplifying the unlimited waste of resources."

Havana naturally stressed Cuban solidarity with fellow Latins, PRENSA LATINA reporting on the 24th that Minister Céspedes had reaffirmed his country's support for "Ecuador, Venezuela and any other country which tries to preserve its natural resources." Moscow also emphasized Cuba's contribution to the conference, with Leonid Levchenko, in a 3 March Moscow radio commentary broadcast in Spanish, noting that Cuba joined other Latin nations in "vigorously participating in joint endeavors," such as OLADE, to resist the attempts of "imperialist forces" to "impose their policy." Commenting on Cuban proposals at the conference, Levchenko said they "undoubtedly respond to the aspirations" of Latin American countries which "want to freely dispose of their natural resources."

* OLADE was considered officially established in December 1974, when Honduras became the twelfth Latin nation to ratify the organization's charter.

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PEKING Peking's coverage of the Jamaica meeting sought to place the conference within the general framework of the Third World struggle for independence. NCNA on 28 February quoted Ecuador's delegate as urging Latins to "join forces with other Third World countries" in order to work for the "establishment of a new international economic order." Along these same lines, NCNA on the 24th noted that Jamaican Premier Michael Manley, in a welcoming address, had "exposed the traditional colonialist and exploitative strategies" used against Latin America and added that the premier had stressed that "this is the historical experience which created the Third World." Neither NCNA nor other communist media apparently mentioned Manley's request that OLADE consider the plight of developing countries which did not produce oil and were "barely surviving" under the burden of oil prices.

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NOTES

DPRK PROTEST ON U.S. TROOPS: A 10 March DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement has denounced the "continued introduction" of U.S. troops into South Korea, citing a 6 March U.S. Defense Department announcement which Pyongyang suggests is evidence of a 4,000-man increase in U.S. troop strength in the ROK. The Foreign Ministry spokesman also charged the United States with planning construction of a new airbase in South Korea, as well as a reorganization of U.S. Army forces there that would lead to "thousands" of additional U.S. troops. The statement also reiterated a Pyongyang allegation that the United States has nuclear weapons in the ROK. The statement made the standard Pyongyang charge that Washington plans to turn the South into a "permanent" U.S. military and nuclear base and a "stronghold for aggression" in Asia. In 1974 three DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman statements were issued specifically concerning U.S. activities in the South. A statement in May denounced the transfer of U.S. F-4 fighters from Thailand to South Korea, another in November protested President Ford's visit to the ROK, and a third statement in December alleged introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons in the South.

PRAGUE MEETING OF CP SECRETARIES: The 4-5 March Prague meeting on communist ideological matters, bringing together party secretaries from the USSR and other socialist countries, struck a less combative note than the last such meeting in Moscow in December 1973. In addition to the CPSU's Ponomarev, the meeting was attended by politburo members or party secretaries from Moscow's orthodox East European allies, as well as from Mongolia and Cuba. Perhaps as a calculated snub to Moscow, Bucharest chose to send a delegation headed by only a central committee deputy section chief, Teodor Marinescu. Neither Stefan Andrei nor Cornel Burtica--Romanian party secretaries who were present at the 1973 Moscow meeting and could have been expected to attend the Prague gathering--attended the current meeting. Apparently concerned with fostering an atmosphere compatible with Moscow's goals regarding a summit-level conclusion of the CSCE and an early convocation of an all-European conference of communist parties, the communique of the meeting softpedaled the vigilance themes that have become routine at communist meetings in recent years. In contrast to the 19 December 1973 communique, which had spoken about the need to resist "ideological subversion" and "aggressive imperialist forces" bent on "torpedoing" detente, the present communique used such mild descriptive phrases in this connection

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as "various forms of bourgeois ideology" and "all kinds of opportunism." Moreover, far from stressing the priority of ideological struggle, the 6 March communique defined the prime need at the present juncture as "informing the world public" about the foreign policy of the socialist states aimed at promoting detente and peaceful coexistence. The communique also noted the parties' intention to coordinate their publicity effort for the upcoming 30th anniversary of the end of World War II and the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCCW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 3 - 9 MARCH 1975

<u>Moscow (2564 items)</u>			<u>Peking (864 items)</u>		
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(7%)	8%	International Women's Day	(--)	9%
International Women's Day	(--)	7%	Congo Prime Minister Lopez in PRC	(9%)	6%
China	(8%)	6%	Cambodia	(9%)	5%
Brezhnev-Husak Meeting on 50th Anniversary of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Union	(--)	4%	OPEC Summit Meeting, Algiers	(--)	4%
			Mozambique Liberation Front President Machel in PRC and DPRK	(3%)	4%
			Grechko in India	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.